Effects of Politically Responsive Agency Spending on Incumbent Vote Shares
In 2011, Congress banned earmarks and eliminated one avenue to claim credit for pork-barrel spending. After the ban, the desire to bring additional federal spending back to home districts did not dissipate. Still, it made it more difficult for legislators to obtain and receive credit from voters for additional expenditures. One available channel for additional spending is informal relationships with the executive branch. Agency leadership with more political appointees allows more opportunities for legislators to engage leaders. The results find positive correlations between increased spending from politically responsive agencies and vote share. (Authors: Thomas Stratmann und Kevon Dwyer)
Veranstaltungssprache
Der Vortrag wird auf Englisch gehalten.
Der Referent
Thomas Stratmann holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Maryland. He is a Distinguished University Professor at Mason and holds an appointment as Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and has a courtesy appointment at the Antonin Scalia Law School. He has written on topics of political economy, law and economics, health economics and experimental economics, and has published in journals such as the American Economic Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Law and Economics, and the Review of Economics and Statistics.